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A failure of governmentality: Why Transparency International 
underestimated corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
The article critiques the Foucauldian approach to governance indicators. 
Transparency International’s (TI) corruption perception index (CPI) 
underestimated Tunisian corruption levels under President Ben Ali. His regime 
was highly corrupt but foreign investors were less affected. CPI methodology 
meant it reflected primarily the needs of foreign investors. The Foucauldian 
approach specifically excludes analysis of governance indicators’ methodologies. 
It thus fails to demonstrate the effectiveness of governance indicators as a 
technology of government, and it fails to show how the production of the CPI is 
embedded in a wider global political economy. 
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Writing in the pages of Third World Quarterly, Oded Lowenheim makes the powerful 
claim that international governance indicators change states’ behaviour, not for fear of 
being disciplined but by governing themselves.1 Such is the power of Foucauldian 
governmentality that the examined state internalises the rationality of the governance 
indicator and acts accordingly. Loewenheim’s article is part of a wider literature which 
argues that governance indicators are an effective technology of Foucauldian 
government, which “normalises” neoliberalism. He uses the example of the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), compiled by the anti-corruption organisation Transparency 
International (TI).  
The first section of this article sets out the claims of the theory Foucauldian 
governmentality regarding governance indicators. I then use the case study of Tunisia to 
critically examine the claim that the CPI is an effective technology of government. The 
fall of the regime of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011 showed that the CPI had 
consistently underestimated corruption levels in Ben Ali’s Tunisia. Faced with the 
discipline of the governance indicator, Tunisia did not “govern itself” – i.e. reduce its 
corruption levels. The next section this article examines the forms of corruption 
prevalent under Ben Ali and the fourth section explains the reasons why TI’s 
methodology did not capture these particular types of corruption: Bias in favour of the 
needs of foreign investors, feedback loops among out-of-country experts, and possible 
regime manipulation. The fifth section uses the findings on Tunisia and TI methodology 
to critique Foucauldian governmentality. The approach works well to explain how TI 
translates neoliberal rationality into a programme to fight corruption. However, 
Foucauldian governmentality does not pay enough attention to the methodology of how 
the CPI is compiled – how it works as a technology of government – and it fails to 
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tackle the wider political economy into which the production of the CPI is embedded. 
The final section concludes. 
 
The puzzle: Transparency International underestimated corruption in Tunisia 
Prior to the fall of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank praised his economic management.2 This is 
because Ben Ali followed donor prescriptions for macro-economic stabilisation and 
opening the country up to foreign investment. European governments also considered 
him an important ally in the fight against Islamism, leading to a largely favourable 
judgement of the regime. A significant section of academia, policy makers, and 
journalists were arguing that Ben Ali’s non-corrupt leadership was the cause of his 
success. Eva Bellin wrote that cronyism between bureaucracy and business was not 
driven by corruption or bribery but cut “red tape” and solved “information problems”. 3 
The developmentalist ethos of Ben Ali and his predecessor Habib Bourguiba and the 
decent remuneration and specialised training of Tunisia’s higher civil service provided 
the “esprit de corps” crucial for the development of an incorruptible state bureaucracy. 
In 2010, just a few months prior to Ben Ali’s departure, the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) identified the absence of corruption and favouritism as a major competitive 
advantage of Tunisia. The “Ibrahim index of African governance” ranked Tunisia 8th in 
Africa in 2010, ahead of all other North African states. Tunisia outperformed most Arab 
countries in Transparency International’s (TI) corruption perception index (CPI).4 The 
Tunisian uprising that evicted Ben Ali in January 2011 shattered the leader’s clean 
image. The president and the Trabelsi clan of his wife Leila had enriched themselves on 
the back of the country’s business success. Pictures of looted luxury villas went around 
the world and the international press publicised lurid tales of greed and self-enrichment. 
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How could the reality of corruption – as revealed by the uprising – and the perception of 
corruption – as measured by global corruption rankings – diverge so drastically?  
This article focuses on Transparency International because its corruption 
perception index is the most influential and the most widely used measure of corruption. 
Why did Transparency International underestimate corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia? 
The CPI is the index which is most commonly used as an example to illustrate how 
governance indicators work as technologies of Foucauldian government.5 The CPI 
scores countries and territories from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) based on 
perceived levels of public sector corruption. A score below 5 is taken as a cut-off point 
for particularly egregious corruption. Tunisia scored 5 or above for five of the 13 years 
under Ben Ali, in which Tunisia was included in the CPI (1998-2010) and came close in 
another three years (see table 1). The score always put Tunisia in the middle of TI’s 
worldwide country ranking. In 2003 TI commended Ben Ali’s Tunisia for being among 
the countries that had improved most compared to the previous year and Tunisia was 
never singled out for criticism in CPI press releases.6 Compared to other African and 
Middle Eastern countries, the scores that Ben Ali’s Tunisia received in the CPI were 
highly respectable and bolstered the country’s “clean” image. Once Ben Ali was 
removed Tunisia’s score plunged to 3.8 in 2011, leaving it at 73rd place in the global 
ranking, down from 4.3 at 59th place in 2010. 
 
[Include table 1 around here] 
 
There was coalition of American and European governments, investors, and 
international financial institutions which were supporting Ben Ali for reasons of 
“security” and economic interest. I am not suggesting that Transparency International 
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was an important pillar of the regime or that it consciously backed Ben Ali. The CPI 
did, however, contribute to a “mood music” of economic reports and press coverage 
which was favourable to the Tunisian regime and to which Ben Ali’s international 
supporters could point to justify their stance. The CPI influences outside perceptions of 
a country. European and North American policy makers, businesspeople, and journalists 
regularly turn to the CPI for a swift authoritative assessment of corruption levels. 
Outsiders would not have thought highly of the Ben Ali regime solely because of the 
CPI, but they would also not have found much material in the CPI to contradict regime 
propaganda claims of clean and efficient government. The CPI influences European 
Union and United States assessments of other countries.7 Tunisia’s high score in the 
CPI meant that the country’s democracy activists lost a potential instrument in their 
struggle, namely independent verification of regime corruption. 
 
Theorising governance indicators: Foucauldian governmentality 
For Foucault, governmentality is a form of power, where “government is the right 
disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end.”8 Government is 
exercised over abstracted “things” such as the economy or a population. The “things” 
are constructed in the process of government, which involves technologies such as 
measuring to make them visible. When TI measures corruption, it makes the 
phenomenon visible. Foucault criticised the “excessive value” attached to the state in 
social science research. For Foucault, the state is a relevant object of study through its 
role in “government”, not as the sole centre of power.9 Similarly, civil society is not 
subordinate to the state but is implicated in the process of government.10 This stands in 
contrast to liberal theory, where global civil society organisations such as TI check the 
power of the overbearing state.11 Foucauldian theory thus makes a novel claim 
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compared to the liberal account. States are not just “disciplined” by governance 
indicators because they “hold states to account” – in liberal parlance – but the indeces 
induce “self-government” as states internalise the rationality of government.12 Rather 
than surveillance and punishment, governmentality “focuses on self-optimisation of 
subjects through individual liberty and freedom of choice.”13 This occurs through 
benchmarking and “responsibilisation”, which produces “the examined state as an 
ethical subject responsible for what occurs within its borders.”14 Governance indicators 
bring about the “normalisation” of neoliberal government.15Yet if a governance 
indicator underestimates corruption, does the examined state still “govern itself”? 
Rose and Miller break down Foucault’s governmentality into three levels of 
analysis.16 The “rationality of government” is the level of political discourse as “a 
domain for the formulation and justification of idealised schemata for representing 
reality, analysing it, and rectifying it.”17 Liberalism and neoliberalism are examples of 
such discourses. At the next level are “programmes of government”, where experts 
identify problems and put forward designs to tackle them. Programmes are informed by 
specific rationalities. Putting forward a programme involves claims to knowledge, for 
instance about the economy, nature, health – or indeed corruption. The third level of 
analysis looks at the technologies of government, the “humble and mundane 
mechanisms” by which programmes are translated into social reality.18 They include 
surveys, techniques of notation and computation, statistics, standardization, specialist 
vocabularies, building designs etc. “Techniques” of government are ways of making a 
problem visible and then governing it.  
And it is here that we find a puzzling omission: Writers using the 
governmentality approach explicitly exclude methodological concerns from their 
analysis because “the theoretical or methodological quality of the reports and their 
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indices is secondary to the governmental work that they do.”19  As I will argue below, 
the methodology of the CPI is the reason why TI underestimated corruption in Tunisia.  
In the following section of the paper I will use secondary literature and US 
diplomatic cables published by wikileaks to establish the forms of corruption prevalent 
in Ben Ali’s Tunisia. I will then have a close look at the methodologies of the CPI and 
of the World Economic Forum’s “World Competitiveness Report”. The latter had an 
important influence on Tunisia’s ranking. TI’s methodology of compiling the CPI was 
the reason why it underestimated the forms of corruption prevalent in Tunisia. The 
discussion is based on methodological briefs issued by TI with the CPI each year, the 
methodology of WEF’s “World Competitiveness Report”, wikileaks cables, and two 
interviews with researchers from TI and the WEF respectively. These interviews were 
conducted to obtain additional data from TI – which they were unable to provide – and 
to be able to reflect their views on the way that the CPI and World Competiveness 
Report have ranked Tunisia in their respective indices.20 The next section then uses 
these findings to critique the claims of Foucauldian governmentality with regard to 
good governance indices. A final section concludes. 
 
 
Forms of corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia 
Tunisia’s first post-independence president Habib Bourguiba had constructed a 
corporatist regime similar to those in other Arab republics in the 1960s.21 
Nationalisation, land reform, import substitution industrialisation and bureaucratic 
expansion bound bureaucrats, workers, and peasants to the corporatist regime. 
Opposition by influential landowners prompted Bourguiba to roll back the 
collectivisation of land and to encourage export-oriented private manufacturing in 1969. 
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The expanding industrial bourgeoisie was mainly drawn from former state managers 
and was not restricted to presidential cronies.22 Tunisia developed an onshore sector in 
textiles, protected from the world market, and an offshore sector of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) in clothing production, with few linkages between the two. 
Despite limited liberalisation in the 1970s the system of corporatist management 
remained in place. Falling receipts from phosphates, remittances, tourism as well as a 
drought caused an economic crisis in 1986. Tunisia had to swallow an IMF “structural 
adjustment programme” which put corporatism under strain. Between the late 1970s 
and mid-1980s, trade unions and the Islamist movement emerged as the most organised 
opposition to the regime.23 Meanwhile, President Bourguiba was growing senile. Prime 
Minister Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali exploited the economic, social, and political crisis to 
conduct a bloodless coup in 1987 and assumed power.  
Ben Ali’s regime remained remarkably stable between 1987 and 2010. This was 
partly due to strong support from Europe and the United States for a regime which was 
seen fighting Islamic terrorism and open to European investment. Some authors stress 
Ben Ali’s deft transformation of the corporatist regime, which became more 
authoritarian but also kept business and the trade unions in line.24 Hibou points out that 
regime maintenance was not simply due to decisions “at the top” but also to 
decentralised and society-wide surveillance through everday economic operations.25 She 
also questioned the reality of the “economic miracle”. Both approaches agree that the 
economy was at the heart of regime maintenance.Many of the economic surveillance 
mechanisms which Hibou examines originated from the president.26  
Ben Ali selectively adopted the rules of neoliberal globalisation to further the 
contradictory goals of regime maintenance and the enrichment of his extended family. 
He encouraged textile exports, tourism, and foreign investment through the 1993 
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investment code and the 1995 Association Agreement with the European Union. The 
basis of Tunisia’s economic success were manufacturing exports  due to a boom in FDI, 
which came mostly from Europe and flowed into textile, clothing and leather production 
for re-export to Europe.27 Tunisia saw spurts of strong economic growth in the 1990s 
and then again in the middle of the 2000s. In 2010 Tunisia was the Arab state with the 
second-highest GDP per capita outside of the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Between Ben Ali’s coup of 1987 and the last year of his rule in 2010, per capita GDP 
almost doubled in real terms. Human development indicators on education and health 
were good. Yet this solid economic and social performance did not amount to the 
“economic miracle” of regime propaganda. The country’s peripheral rural regions 
remained underdeveloped and Tunisia failed to move up the value chain to high tech 
manufacturing.28  
Ben Ali used the economy to co-opt or control potential challengers.  He 
cracked down on Islamists in 1990, imprisoning several and excluding ex-prisoners 
from the labour market.29 The regime maintained its alliance with tamed trade unions. A 
system of social security kept the rural and urban poor in line. The Fonds de Solidarité 
Nationale (FSN) paid for development projects in the Tunisian periphery. The 
distribution of funds was entirely at the discretion of Ben Ali and a well-oiled PR 
machine publicised the president’s grandeur.30 The state threatened tax audits to collect 
the supposedly voluntary contributions from businesses. The audits would inevitably 
unearth a break of the country’s deliberately arcane tax rules.31 The Banque Tunisienne 
de Solidarité (BTS) operated on a similar model of forced contributions from employees 
and businesses as well as opaque and discretionary distribution of benefits. The bank 
provided micro-loans, with debt acting as a means of political control.32 State aid was 
used selectively to benefit cronies.33 
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Regulation kept competitors out of markets dominated by companies of the Ben 
Ali and Trabelsi clan which accounted for an estimated 21 per cent of all net private 
sector profits in 2010.34 The clans extracted monopoly rents from services such as real 
estate, retail, telecommunications and media, tourism, and finance but largely 
sidestepped the SME-dominated clothing and textile sector.35 The Ben Ali and Trabelsi 
clans had already started to enrich themselves in the 1990s but became more predatory 
from 1996 onwards.36 In 2002 Ben Ali reportedly exhorted his family members to use 
straw men and front companies to prevent bad publicity.37 At this time, Transparency 
International’s ranking was still not indicating the high levels of corruption represented 
by the family.  
Foreign investment in the offshore manufacturing sector seems to have been off-
limits for extortion. According to a United States embassy cable from 2008, Leila’s son 
Belhassen Trabelsi “was explicitly cautioned to avoid offshore companies”.38 The 
“family” did target foreign companies in the energy and services sector,39 but a 2008 
United States embassy cable concluded that “[f]oreign investors more rarely report 
encountering the type of extortion faced by Tunisians, perhaps reflecting that foreign 
investors have recourse to their own embassies and governments.”40 The Ben Ali 
regime consciously fostered the appearance of a rule-based bureaucracy for 
international consumption. It signed an association agreement with the EU in 1995 and 
acceded to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). One foreign diplomat argued that this 
was deceptive: 
“Tunisia is a country filled with laws and appears to be complying with all 
demands of international lenders. It appears to be on track to building a real 
market economy. The reality, however, differs a lot. Even though many laws 
exist, they are not necessarily enforced and certainly not applied equally to all. 
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[…] Application of procedures and imposing obstacles is arbitrary and very 
clearly depends on ‘who you are’.”41  
The Ben Ali regime stayed open to European outsourcing. Corruption was widely 
known and discussed. Beau and Tuqoui recount a widely-read 1990s pamphlet called 
“the families who pillage Tunisia”.42 Cammett  recounts hearing frequent complaints by 
export-oriented manufacturing businesses about cronyism and corruption during her 
interviews conducted in the late 1990s.43 United States embassy cables published on 
Wikileaks include numerous accounts of regime corruption. The widespread knowledge 
about Tunisian corruption was not reflected in the corruption perception index, although 
the Tunisian score did deteriorate from 2004 onwards. It still remained respectable and 
the decline in the TI ranking did not do justice to the depth of regime corruption.  
 
Why the CPI underestimated corruption in Tunisia 
Transparency International’s methodology caused it to underestimate corruption levels 
in Tunisia. There is an extensive academic debate of the TI methodology.44 The CPI is a 
composite index. Transparency International collects reports “from independent 
institutions specialising in governance and business climate analysis”.45 TI does not 
conduct its own in-country research but relies entirely on secondary sources in 
compiling the CPI. TI’s underestimation of Tunisian corruption is therefore not due to 
the inherent difficulties of conducting field research in non-democratic regimes. I am 
not suggesting that TI maliciously or purposely ignored signs of corruption in Ben Ali’s 
Tunisia. Of the secondary sources that TI uses to compile the CPI, only the WEF’s 
World Competitiveness Report was based on an in-country survey. The difficulties and 
pitfalls of this particular survey are discussed below. TI checks the quality of the 
sources and whether the questions that they ask about corruption fit within their own 
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remit of what corruption entails. Until 2011 – the period we are interested in – TI then 
converted the ranks of countries in the individual sources into a score from 0 to 10.46 TI 
then averaged these “transformed data” for the individual sources, yielding a country’s 
CPI score. TI has not published the “transformed data” for each individual source, 
except for the years 2010 and 2011.47 Let us then look at the scores for 2010, the last 
year that Ben Ali was in power. Several scores stand out (see table 1). The World 
Economic Forum (WEF) scores Tunisia a lot higher than the other sources, giving the 
country 6.6 for both its 2009 and 2010 surveys, higher than IHS Global Insight Risk 
Rating (4.7), the Economist Intelligence Unit (3.3), African Development Bank (2.5) 
and Bertelsmann Foundation (2.3). I therefore had a closer look at the WEF 
data.Possible manipulation: World Economic Forum 
The WEF polls thousands of business executives globally in its “executive opinion 
survey”. The polls are then used to compile the World Competitiveness Report. In a list 
of the greatest problems businesspeople faced in Tunisia in 2010, corruption came only 
on 11th place.48 The WEF poll considered the absence of favouritism in decisions of 
government officials as a competitive advantage of Tunisia. This is astonishing, 
considering the staggering degree of nepotism revealed after the fall of Ben Ali. WEF 
researchers themselves noticed the rather positive responses prior to 2011.49 The WEF 
researchers say they undertook due diligence on the data for Tunisia but they did not 
find any proof of influence or manipulation by the government or by the Tunisian 
partner institute which conducted the survey. There are several possible causes for the 
incongruent results of the WEF. The survey may have captured many firms who 
benefited from favouritism. In 2010, 61 per cent of businesses in the sample of 100 had 
more than 100 employees but 98.4 per cent of all formal sector firms in Tunisia have 
fewer than 100 employees.50 Larger firms were more likely to be close to the regime. 
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The WEF relies on 150 partner institutes worldwide to administer the survey, 
with one partner per country. The WEF requires at least 80 responses from a country 
and asks their partner institute to use a random sample in line with good statistical 
practice.51 It should therefore not be possible for partner institutes to just send the 
questionnaire to “family and friends”. The WEF’s statistical method was formally 
correct but the political context in which the survey was administered in Tunisia may 
have bumped up the Tunisian result. The survey was conducted by the Institut Arabe 
des Chefs d’Entreprises (IACE). Cammett characterises IACE as “an association 
grouping together big business interests” and writes that it was “taken over” by the 
government in 1994, when Chakib Nouira became its president.52 He is the son of Hedi 
Nouira, prime minister from 1970 to 1980 and architect of Tunisia’s economic opening. 
The previous head of IACE, Mansour Moalla, had fallen foul of the regime in 1993, 
when he criticised the Tunisian government for being too obedient to the World Bank 
and IMF. In retaliation, state officials arranged for the withdrawal of funds from BIAT 
Bank, presided over by Moalla. He had to step down to save the bank and also resigned 
from IACE. Moalla’s departure meant that IACE “necessarily functions as a less 
independent and dynamic force than was the case under its founding leadership.”53 The 
WEF researchers reject the suggestion that IACE may have been an inappropriate 
partner to conduct the survey.54 While they had difficulties identifying an institute in 
Tunisia that was independent of the government, it was not their impression that IACE 
was close to the regime. They point out that the leadership of the institute did not 
change after the fall of Ben Ali but the results plummeted anyhow and remained low 
despite all the political changes the country went through.55  
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Tunisian businessmen at the time were wary of IACE. A United States embassy 
cable records Tunisians’ suspicious response to the 2006 World Competitiveness 
Report: 
“A number of the interlocutors stated that the Institut Arabe Des Chefs 
d’Entreprises (IACE) conducted the survey of Tunisian business executives that 
was used as a basis for this WEF report.  This organization is said to be linked 
with the extended family of President Ben Ali and thus, in the average Tunisian 
business leader’s mind, the results are suspect.”56 
The embassy concludes: “It could very well be that the critics are right and that IACE 
only surveyed and provided input from business leaders who would provide politically-
correct, positive impressions.” Overt manipulation is only one possible explanation for 
the highly positive survey results. Another aspect to bear in mind is that Tunisia was a 
police state full of informers. When businesses received a questionnaire from an 
association they considered close to the regime, they must have assumed – rightly or 
wrongly – that their responses would be monitored by the state. An honest response to 
the survey could have put them in danger of retaliation by the regime. Had the WEF 
survey been excluded from the CPI, Tunisia would have scored 3.2 in 2010, rather than 
4.3. This would have put Tunisia in rank 91 of 178, rather than 59, and behind its 
notoriously corrupt neighbour Morocco, which scored 3.4. The problem was 
compounded by a methodological quirk by which the CPI counted both the 2009 and 
2010 WEF reports. Transparency International relies on two types of sources: business 
executive opinion surveys such as the WEF report, and scores by country, risk, or expert 
analysts such as those provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Bertelsmann 
Foundation, and IHS Global Insight. When multiple years of the same business opinion 
survey are available, TI includes data for the last two years to smooth abrupt changes 
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and make the index more stable.57 The impact of the WEF on Tunisia’s score was thus 
doubled. 
Private sector bias 
TI has been criticised for its extensive reliance on sources written for large transnational 
corporations.58 These clients care about the risk of having to pay a bribe but are less 
concerned about other forms of corruption. This is evident in the definitions of 
corruption used by CPI sources. All the five sources TI used for Tunisia in 2010 took 
bribery into account but only the EIU looked at the abuse of public office for regime 
maintenance.59 Table 1 shows the preponderance of private sector-oriented sources in 
the CPI between 2001 and 2011. Each year TI was using at least twice as many private 
sector-oriented reports than policy maker-oriented ones, with the exception of 2002. 
The years 2010 and 2011, for which the scores are publicly available, show that private 
sector-oriented sources provided much higher scores for Tunisia than policy maker-
oriented ones.60 In Ben Ali’s Tunisia, international investors were less affected by 
regime extortion. The risk of having to bribe public officials is of course a legitimate 
concern of foreign investors, but it is not clear why this should be given overwhelming 
weight in constructing the CPI. TI argues that the range of different sources it uses 
means that it captures corruption very comprehensively.61 However, the choice of 
sources is not driven by the need to balance different perspectives – and who knows 
what the “correct” balance would be anyhow – but the availability of sources for a given 
country. Compiling corruption rankings from surveys or experts is expensive. Hence, 
most are compiled for-profit and aimed at corporate clients. TI then relies on these 
overwhelmingly commercial sources. 
 
Feedback loops 
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Knack warns of the “interdependence of sources” in the CPI.62 The authors of different 
surveys may rely on other corruption surveys used to compile the CPI (or the CPI 
itself). Alternatively, they may all rely on similar sources such as media outlets, 
academic research, or reports from NGOs or international organisations for their 
corruption assessment. This creates a feedback loop among country experts, which 
reproduces received wisdom. Received wisdom on Ben Ali’s Tunisia was that there was 
little corruption. Out-of-country desk research is particularly prone to such feedback 
loops. Of the Tunisia sources in 2010 the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and IHS Global Insight all relied on out-of-country 
experts.63 The respondents tend to be members of a global elite, whether Tunisian 
business executives or country experts inside and outside of the country yet the 
experience of corruption at the bottom of the social hierarchy and at the top is very 
different.  Transparency International’s methodology excluded the voices of Tunisians 
such as Mohammed Bouazizi whose self-immolation started the “Jasmin revolution” in 
2010. 
 
Theorising Transparency International’s Failure 
 
 
TI’s underestimation of corruption in Tunisia allows us to critically assess the 
claims that Foucauldian governmentality makes about governance indicators. As 
discussed above, Rose and Miller break governmentality down to three levels: An 
overarching rationality, for instance neoliberalism, is translated into programmes to 
govern specific problems, such as poverty, disease, or corruption. Finally, technologies 
of government are deployed to tackle the problem and make it visible, for instance 
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statistics, surveys, laws. With regard to the Transparency International, Foucauldian 
theory provides a convincing account of the translation of neoliberal rationality into a 
programme to tackle corruption. The document which provided the analytical basis for 
TI’s fight against corruption was the “Sourcebook”, written by then-managing director 
of TI Jeremy Pope in 1996 and updated in 2000.64 Pope subscribes to the neoliberal 
consensus of a “clean” capitalism which is more efficient and equitable if purged of 
bribery. Pope writes that “much of government-led development efforts in the past have 
been mishandled, and have generated waste rather than development” and that the state 
“should not attempt to compete with the private sector.”65 Corruption “strikes at the 
heart of the market economy, distorting decision-making, and rewarding the corrupt and 
manipulative rather than the efficient and productive”.66 Corruption undermines private 
sector development and deters foreign direct investment (FDI).67 Pope remains silent 
about power relations in contemporary global capitalism. He excludes questions of 
labour relations, the privatisation of public services, or global inequalities. His 
analytical framework is unsuitable for understanding political economy dynamics such 
as the Ben Ali’s post-corporatist authoritarianism. Pope identifies a problem – 
corruption – and renders it in the language of neoclassical political economy: corruption 
undermines the functioning of free markets, functioning free markets are a prerequisite 
for sustained economic growth, hence corrupt countries cannot achieve sustained 
economic growth and, in turn, countries that achieve sustained economic growth cannot 
be corrupt. This claim is contradicted by highly corrupt high-growth economies such as 
South Korea, China, or Malaysia. There are forms of corruption which enhance or at 
least do not hold back economic growth. Capitalist development involves the 
reassignment of property rights. Since this process can never be entirely legitimate, 
corruption is an integral part of capitalist development.68 
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The governmentality approach can give a convincing account of the way in 
which TI converts neoliberal rationality into an anti-corruption programme but it fails to 
seriously engage with the third level of analysis, namely corruption measurement as a 
technology of government. Garland suggested the need for an analysis of the 
“pragmatics of use” because “governmental programmes are never perfectly realised in 
practice”.69 Tosa maintains that “governmentality studies have to go beyond the 
tendency to totalise and they must instead look at specific ways in which the actual 
powers operate.”70 Porter laments “the pre-eminence of large-scale mentalities relative 
to material and micro-practices” and criticises that in governmentality analyses “the 
effects of indices rest heavily on the mentality of ordering, or on the way they express a 
larger rationality, and less attention is paid to how indices interact with the material 
aspects of the networks in which they operate.”71 This is precisely where analysis of 
Tunisia comes in: TI underestimated corruption in Tunisia, which meant there was no 
“self-government” by the Tunisian regime. The CPI would not have induced a change 
in behaviour because it did not contradict regime propaganda of clean and efficient 
government. 
The main point in Loewenheim’s article on governance indicators and the CPI is 
that they “responsibilise” the examined state and thus “they also obscure (even if 
unintentionally) the responsibility of other actors for a host of social, economic and 
political problems”.72 Who are these other actors? How are they responsible for the 
problems of the examined states? And how do these power constellations shape the 
process of compiling governance indicators? Loewenheim hints at a hierarchically 
organised global economy, in which powerful actors – states, transnational corporations 
– bear responsibility for corruption in countries such as Tunisia. This is the wider 
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political economy context within which the CPI is being produced and within which TI 
underestimated corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia.  
By not linking the technology of government to the wider global political 
economy, the governmentality approach is missing a trick. It is also applying a very 
selective approach to the analysis of governmentality, in which it is a smooth and 
undisrupted flow of power from the experts who formulate programmes and 
technologies within the neoliberal rationality to the examined state. However, 
something intervenes in this flow from TI’s Berlin headquarter to Ben Ali’s palace in 
Tunis, and it is the structure of the market for business information. The majority of 
corruption rankings is produced as a commercial service to large transnational 
corporations. They are primarily worried about the need to bribe top officials but less 
concerned about political corruption of the kind that Ben Ali practiced, which affected 
local small and medium-sized businesses. These private sector-oriented sources account 
for the bulk of sources which TI relies on to compile the CPI. The inherent bias towards 
measuring bribery – rather than a more comprehensive definition of corruption –
reduced Tunisia’s CPI score.  
TI is also on the market for media attention. The CPI is the primary way for 
Transparency International to achieve press coverage. Around the date that the CPI is 
published, the number of google searches for the term “corruption” shoots up.73 Wide 
media coverage is necessary to keep corruption – and Transparency’s anti-corruption 
work – on the agenda. This puts TI under pressure to maximise the number of countries 
covered and to take a laissez faire attitude towards the use of their data by journalists. 
Prior to 2011, the press releases accompanying the CPI always included a warning that 
comparison of score or rank over time is not possible because different sources may 
have been used in different years.74 However, media sources still did frequently 
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compare ranks and scores over time. An assessment of CPI 2012 methodology invited 
by Transparency International recommended that TI include only countries for which it 
can utilise at least six sources, rather than the current threshold of three.75 This would 
exclude 58 countries in the 2012 ranking. The CPI would be less attractive to media, 
NGOs, policy makers and academics. TI must constantly balance methodological rigour 
and its attractiveness to the media.  
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to use TI’s underestimation of Tunisian corruption to 
critique the claims of Foucauldian governmentality about governance indicators. 
Foucauldian governmentality explains how TI translated neoliberal rationality into a 
programme to govern corruption but displays a curious disinterest in the details in 
which the CPI actually works as a technology of government. The CPI underestimated 
Tunisian corruption due to an over-reliance on private sector-oriented sources, feedback 
loops of “received wisdom” among out-of-country experts, and possibly regime 
manipulation. TI lacks critical distance towards its sources. A more critical stance 
would have reduced the number of available sources and would therefore also have 
reduced the number of countries covered in the CPI. This, in turn, would make the 
index less newsworthy. The NGO needs to constantly balance methodological “rigour” 
and the need to produce an index that is “marketable” to the world’s media. The bias 
towards private sector-sources and attention to bribery over other types of corruption 
took the sting out of the potentially disruptive corruption issue.  
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Table 1: Data sources and corruption perception index scores for Tunisia: 2001-2011 
Source: Transparency International 
Note: TI converted the ranks of countries in the individual sources into a score from 0 to 10. TI then 
averaged these “transformed data” for the individual sources, yielding a country’s CPI score. Sources for 
2005 are not available. Numerical scores for the “transformed data” are only available for 2010 and 
2011. In previous years (2001-2009), the pound sign (#) signifies that a source has been used in 
compiling the CPI, a blank cell signifies that a source was not used for that year.  
Transparency International relies on two types of sources: business executive opinion surveys (e.g. WEF 
Global), and secondly scores by country, risk, or expert analysts (e.g. IHS, EIU, MIG, PRS-ICRG, AfDB, BTI, 
CU, WB). When multiple years of the same survey are available for business opinion surveys such as 
WEF, TI includes data for the last two years to smooth abrupt changes and make the index more stable.  
a) World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report. b) World Economic Forum, Africa 
Competitiveness Report. c) IHS Global Insight, Global Risk Service (Until 2006 called WMRC: World 
Markets Research Centre). d) Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Risk Service and Country Forecast. e) 
Merchant International Group. f) Political Risk Services, International Country Risk Guide. g) African 
Development Bank, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. h) Bertelsmann Foundation, 
Transformation Index. i) Columbia University, State Capacity Survey. j) World Bank, World Business 
Environment Survey. 
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